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 T HE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM was severely tested in the 1970s
 and it is not yet obvious that the system's response to those tests was
 adequate. Some scholars have argued that the confusion we wit-
 nessed in energy, environmental and economic policies was sympto-
 matic of even worse situations to come. Their consensus is that our
 style of democratic politics is incapable of dealing with the problems
 we increasingly face. Consequently, they predict that democracy's
 days are numbered. Furthermore, many Americans sense that the
 "joy ride" may be over, and that our economy may be hard pressed
 to maintain standards, much less continue its historic growth. One
 poll showed a 34 percent increase, since 1977, in respondents who
 believe, "The United States is in deep and serious trouble,"' and a
 well-known economist, employing the terminology of game theory,
 has suggested that ours has become a "Zero-Sum Society. "2
 The starting point for most of these pessimistic assessments is the
 * The authors wish to thank Northern Arizona University for research support and
 several anonymous reviewers for their cogent observations.
 I Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc., Time Magazine (February 11, 1980).
 2 Lester Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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 growing body of literature discussing our dwindling natural re-
 sources. The environmentalist era produced numerous challenges
 to the assumption that a growing human population can experience
 the levels of material welfare currently enjoyed by a few societies.3
 This reckoning has led to a second question: can the United States
 maintain its relative level of wealth as bitterness and resource
 pressures deepen elsewhere? Such neo-Malthusian accountings
 have been disputed,4 and the jury is still out: it is not easy to deter-
 mine whether there are impending or actual shortages of basic
 resources. And even if there prove to be enough resources to go
 around, there is still the question of whether international political
 conditions, including the possible formation of cartels, will allow us
 access to them.5
 One result of these sometimes conflicting messages about the ma-
 terial basis for modern societies is a revival of the century old
 debate about the relationship between economic wealth and democ-
 racy. We again find ourselves questioning democracy's ability to
 detach itself (as a political system) from the economic surroundings
 in which it customarily thrives. The concern of many is that declin-
 ing resources will mean declining democracy. To explore this ques-
 tion, we must first examine whether any causal relationship be-
 tween economic conditions and democracy has actually been
 established.
 American historians have asked a closely related question: to what
 extent is economic abundance responsible for the foundations and
 maintenance of democracy? Alexis de Tocqueville first noted the
 relationship between the Americans' bountiful continent and their
 3 Beyond the voluminous general "environmentalist" literature, such as Paul R.
 Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York: Ballantine, 1974), there
 are a few works that attempt "proof," such as Dennis L. Meadows et al, The Limits to
 Growth (New York: Universe, 1972); and Jay W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cam-
 bridge, Mass: Wright-Allen, 1971).
 4 For "disproofs," see the Sussex University team's work in H.S.D. Cole et al,
 Models of Doom: A Critique of the Limits to Growth (New York: Universe, 1973); and
 Thomas J. Boyle, "Hope for the Technological Solution," Nature (September 21,
 1973), 127-128.
 See Fred Bergsten, "The Response to the Third World," Foreign Policy, 11 (Sum-
 mer 1973), 102-124; "The Threat is Real," Foreign Policy, 14 (Spring 1974), 84-90;
 and Stephen D. Krasner, "Oil is the Exception," Foreign Policy, 14 (Spring 1974),
 68-83. Also, supporting Krasner, Philip Trezise, "How Many OPEC's in our Future?"
 New York Times (February 10, 1974).
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 impressive degree of social, economic, and political mobility.6
 Frederick Jackson Turner and Walter Prescott Webb, the "frontier"
 theorists, described the relationship more fully: in Turner's view,
 our ancestors constantly left the institutional barriers and social
 biases of established societies for the democraticizing frontier, and
 their experience in new settlements reinforced democratic national
 traditions. The results were egalitarianism, practicality, optimism,
 and an irrepressible exuberance of spirit. Turner speculated that
 the end of the frontier might reduce these characteristics, thereby
 eroding American democracy.7
 Sixty years later, historian David Potter explained why Turner's
 worries were unfounded. Turner ". . . did not recognize that . . .
 the frontier was simply . .. the most accessible form of abundance."
 Furthermore, from Potter's optimistic 1954 perspective, it seemed
 that economic abundance would never end. In fact, Potter's main
 concern was that we stop moralizing to the rest of the world about
 the virtues of democracy and start to export our technological and
 economic know-how so that they could develop their own abun-
 dance, and thence, democracy. Potter's economic determinism was
 clear. "In every country, the system of government is a by-product
 of the general conditions of life . . . democracy is clearly most ap-
 propriate for the countries which enjoy an economic surplus. "8
 Political scientists also have been concerned with the relationship
 between economic wealth and democracy. Lipset, Dahl, and Cut-
 right each posited a close empirical relationship;9 Neubauer's criti-
 que, on the other hand, illustrates that while underdeveloped
 6 David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American
 Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 466.
 7 For this thesis, see Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in
 American History," and other essays, in George Rogers Taylor, ed. The Turner
 Thesis: Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History (Boston: Heath,
 1971). Also, Turner's The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, 1920);
 Richard Hofstadter and S.M. Lipset, eds., Turner and the Sociology of the Frontier
 (New York: Basic Books, 1968); and Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Frontier
 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952).
 8 Potter, 158, 112.
 9 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 2nd Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
 Prentice-Hall, 1970), 68; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday,
 1960), Chs. 2, 3; and Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measure-
 ment and Social Correlates," in Nelson Polsby, R.A. Dentler, and P.A. Smith, eds.
 Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963), 569-582.
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 societies have trouble establishing democracy, it is hard to prove
 that the richer countries are "the more likely they are to become
 democratic." He asserts that a "full range of factors" beyond socio-
 economic development will have to be taken into account, and that
 "above the 'developmental threshold' there is no significant relation-
 ship between democratic political development and socio-economic
 development. "10 Almond and Powell support this cautious view,
 pointing out that differentiation of political structures is bound to
 follow high levels of economic development. Consequent structural
 autonomy must not, however, be automatically assumed. In other
 words, relatively high levels of socio-economic modernity bring only
 the potential for "modern" political systems: they may be demo-
 cratic, or they may develop authoritarianism to a degree not con-
 ceivable in the past."1
 These general considerations provide a backdrop to the specific
 question of what effects scarcity may have on American political
 life. The "Decade of the Environment" began with laws, and
 analyses soon followed. Some popular texts are skeptical of our
 political system's ability to face the challenges. Walter Rosenbaum
 calls for greater national government regulation to overcome the
 centrifugal effects of federalism and pluralism.'2 Cynthia Enloe's
 comparative study argues the same point: controlling environment,
 natural resources, population, land use, and related problems re-
 quires the capacity to plan and co-ordinate. Of the countries she
 examined, the United States is "perhaps the most severely under-
 developed" in these capabilities. Nonetheless, she argues that plan-
 ning will inevitably have to come, and "such imperatives usually
 curtail Nader-like citizen participation. "13 At the least, such
 evaluations call for the end of what Lowi has termed "distributive"
 politics-the style which essentially expresses what is unique about
 the American political approach.'4
 10 Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political
 Science Review, 61 (December 1967), 1002-1009.
 11 Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown,
 1966), 217,308.
 12 The Politics of Environmental Concern, 2nd Edition (New York: Praeger, 1977),
 48, 89, 110-111, 194, 210-211, 247, 251.
 13 The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective (New York: David
 McKay, 1975), 236-237.
 14 Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political
 Theory," World Politics, 16 (1964), 689-690.
 ABUNDANCE, DEMOCRACY AND DIRE PREDICTIONS 369
 Despite their critiques, Enloe and Rosenbaum have not given up
 hope that we can retain democracy. Their solutions can be likened
 to that major school in American political science which sees no con-
 tradiction between centralized political power and democracy and
 even envisions some political good resulting from apparent eco-
 nomic constraints. McConnell, Kariel, and Lowi, for example, ar-
 gue that pluralistic federalism leads to localized systems of pre-
 judice, interest group dominance, and non-resolution of issues. 15 For
 these scholars, greater centralization and planning would enhance
 democracy because increased emphasis on national power can only
 reduce the significance of local elites and "veto groups," leaving a
 stronger defense of the public interest. They may be right, but their
 definition of democracy differs from more traditional, liberty-
 emphasizing, American ideals.
 Other social scientists identify deeper dilemmas for democracy,
 however defined. In separate studies Miles, Ophuls, and Heil-
 broner have painted dismal pictures of a society either brought vir-
 tually to its knees by its technological vulnerability to growing
 numbers of dissidents and saboteurs,"' or dominated by a
 "technocratic priesthood" brought to power through our attempt to
 maintain high material living standards by emphasizing nuclear
 technology.'7 To Ophuls, "growth," America's "secular religion,"
 will have to go, along with capitalism, since that system's practice is
 to ignore external (social and environmental) costs. It is no wonder,
 he concludes, that, "Democracy as we know it cannot conceivably
 survive. "18 Heilbroner agrees: no modern governmental systems,
 democratic or other, will overcome the problems of governing in an
 era without economic hope."'
 Thus, there has been a major debate over the likelihood and sig-
 15 For example, Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New
 York: Knopf, 1966), and Henry S. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stan-
 ford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1961).
 16 Rufus E. Miles, Jr., Awakening from the American Dream: The Social and
 Political Limits to Growth (New York: Universe, 1976), 198.
 17 Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977), 158-160,
 167, 176, 185.
 18 Ibid., 152. Ophul's book has been highly acclaimed, receiving awards in 1977 as
 the best publication of the year on United States national policy from the American
 Political Science Association, and the best book of the year in international relations
 from the International Studies Association.
 "I Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect: Updated for the
 1980s (New York: Norton, 1980), 17, 101, 105-106, 159-160.
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 nificance of these dire predictions for democracy. Two recent jour-
 nal articles have reviewed the "democracy and abundance"
 literature. Susan Leeson has tied these theories to traditional
 political ideas about the limits of authoritarian systems. She
 disputes the wisdom of succumbing to Leviathan: better to practice
 a politics of persuasion to commit the masses willingly to make the
 sacrifices necessary for the new era. For Leeson, mankind's choices
 are either (1) to give in to "the lowest components in our nature," by
 which she presumably means authoritarianism; or (2) ". . . to aspire
 to realize our highest faculties by reaffirming our capacity to reason
 and seek justice based on faith in an objective, intelligible order. "20
 Leeson's contribution hardly advances the discussion: it can be
 argued that using our "God-like faculties" rather than our "animal-
 ity" is precisely what got us into our present fix.
 David Orr and Stuart Hill have also disputed the gloomy prog-
 nostications that democracy will face inexorable pressure from de-
 clining material abundance. Their basic premise is that if the
 American technological response to the crisis were to take a "soft
 path," emphasizing demographic decentalization and renewable
 energy sources, traditional political liberties and structures would
 be quite maintainable. Along with Leeson, Orr and Hill are wary
 of extremist deductions: two tragedies are ". . . to be avoided. One
 is the very real possibility that we will wantonly destroy our life sup-
 port system. The other is the almost equally grim prospect that we
 will jettison the open society and much of our western heritage in
 the name of survival. "21 As stated, these options are surely
 undesirable. But Orr and Hill do not offer a convincing alter-
 native. The "soft energy path" they advocate might actually allow
 social decentralization, which would preserve localism and the
 liberties we know. But as they admit, "Decentralization does not as
 yet constitute a clear policy option. . . . Proponents of small-is-
 beautiful are often vulnerable to criticisms made of utopian thought
 generally. "22
 Most of these scholarly discussions have involved broad theorizing
 about the relationship between economic abundance and
 democracy. Extant empirical work has employed comparative ag-
 20 Susan M. Leeson, "Philosophic Implications of the Ecological Crisis: The
 Authoritarian Challenge to Liberalism," Polity, 11 (Winter 1978), 303-318.
 21 David W. Orr and Stuart Hill, "Leviathan, the Open Society, and the Crisis of
 Ecology," Western Political Quarterly, 31 (December 1978), 457-469.
 22 Ibid., 466.
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 gregate data using nation-states as the basic units of analysis. But,
 as Abraham Miller and his colleagues have argued, one cannot make
 inferences about individual perceptions from theoretically remote
 aggregate indicators.23 To examine the impact of scarcity on a
 given society, one must explore the attitudes of its individual
 members, which is what we propose to do.
 No study has looked specifically at the impact of declining
 material abundance on democratic attitudes at the individual level.
 Ted Bartell, using a sample drawn from Los Angeles County, found
 that, "Persons of lower political trust and lower generalized system
 support were less likely to perceive the energy crisis as real or
 serious.... "24 Although he argued that widespread unemployment
 due to energy shortages would depress levels of political trust, this is
 not apparent in his data analysis because he employed "seriousness
 of the energy crisis" as his dependent variable and political trust as
 the independent variable.
 Other studies have examined the relationship between a par-
 ticular group's sense of economic well-being and its willingness to
 engage in violent acts. Miller and his colleagues argued, for exam-
 ple, that "relative deprivation theory" did not explain the black ur-
 ban riots of the late 1960s.25 Edward Muller also found the theory
 unable directly to explain what he terms "aggressive political par-
 ticipation."26
 Yet another relevant body of literature explores the impact of
 general economic conditions on partisan voting behavior. The find-
 ings are not consistent. Tufte, Klorman, and Weatherford suggest
 in separate studies that changes in aggregate economic conditions
 have some impact on individual voting behavior.27 On the other
 23 Abraham Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, "The J-Curve Theory and
 the Black Urban Riots," American Political Science Review, 71 (September 1977), 968.
 24 Ted Bartell, "Political Orientations and Public Response to the Energy Crisis,"
 Social Science Quarterly, 57 (September 1976), 435. See also David 0. Sears, Tom R.
 Tyler, Jack Citrin, and Donald Kinder, "Political System Support and Public Response
 to the Energy Crisis," American Journal of Political Science, 22 (February 1978),
 56-81; and Paul Allen Beck, "The Correlates of Energy Conservation," Public Policy,
 28 (Fall 1980), 451-472.
 25 Miller, "The J-Curve Theory ...," 981.
 26 Edward Miller, Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
 sity Press, 1979), 182.
 27 Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
 sity Press, 1978); Richard Klorman, "Trends in Personal Finance and the Vote,"
 Public Opinion Quarterly, 42 (Spring 1978), 31-48; and Stephen Weatherford,
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 hand, after a study of elections from 1956 to 1972, Fiorina con-
 cluded that economic conditions sometimes do influence voting
 behavior and political participation-and sometimes they do not.28
 Kinder and Kiewiet were more definite. They found for 1956-76
 that, "Congressional voting is seldom motivated by perception of
 declining personal financial wellbeing or unemployment ex-
 periences. ..."29 Their conclusion was confirmed by a study of the
 1974 and 1976 elections. Political judgments, they argued, were
 much more likely to be influenced by partisan considerations.
 "Under ordinary circumstances, voters evidently do not make con-
 nections between their own personal economic ex-
 periences-however vivid, immediate, and otherwise
 significant-and their political attitudes and preferences."30 They
 explain this conclusion by arguing that the American people prefer
 to accept responsibility for their own economic misfortunes rather
 than politicize their grievances.
 This theme receives support from Sniderman and Brody, who
 argue that "Americans as a rule do not believe that government
 ought to help them. "31 and is confirmed in a comprehensive
 study of the relationship between unemployment and political
 behavior and attitudes which concludes,
 There appeared to be little connection between personal economic conditions and
 social ideology. This was seen most strikingly in the absence of a link between the
 severe personal strain of unemployment and cynicism about the American Dream, or
 heightened class consciousness.32
 Furthermore, while the authors found that the unemployed did
 vote less, they attributed this to demographic characteristics, rather
 than to unemployment-induced withdrawal. Supporting this con-
 tention, Rosenstone and Wolfinger found that short-term
 "Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in the Political
 Response to Recession," American Journal of Political Science, 22 (November 1978),
 916-938.
 28 Morris Fiorina, "Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elec-
 tions," American Journal of Political Science, 22 (May 1978), 426-443.
 29 Donald Kinder and D.R. Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior:
 The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional
 Voting," American Journal of Political Science, 23 (August 1979), 522.
 30 Ibid.
 31 Paul Sniderman and Richard Brody, "Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance,"
 American Journal of Political Science, 21 (August 1977), 517.
 32 Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, Injury to Insult: Unemployment,
 Class and Political Response (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 347.
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 unemployed were less likely to vote than those unemployed for a
 longer period.33 Finally, James Barber discovered no relationship
 between downward social mobility and political extremism.3
 In summary, the relationship between general economic condi-
 tions on the one hand, and political attitudes and behavior on the
 other, is not as obvious as it appears to be. Nevertheless, there con-
 tinues to be much speculation about this relationship, and much of it
 quite clearly asserts that an era of scarcity poses a grave threat to
 American Democracy.35 It is the purpose of this paper to see if this
 is so.
 METHODOLOGY
 Any significant relationship between economic prospects and
 democracy ought to be reflected in measurable individual behavior
 and attitudes. We hypothesize that those Americans who perceive
 personally worsening economic conditions will be the first to react,
 even during relatively prosperous times such as the 1970s. Their at-
 titudes should show declining commitment to democratic principles
 and activities.
 We further hypothesize that changing individual economic status
 will be more directly related to such political attitudes than will ab-
 solute levels: according to Margaret Mead, the American way of life
 is geared to the individual's striving for success over time. The
 American measures accomplishment by how far he has progressed
 from the point of departure rather than by the present niche he oc-
 33 Stephen Rosenstone and Raymond Wolfinger, Voting Turnout in Midterm Elec-
 tions (Berkeley: Institute of Government Studies, 1978), 47.
 34 James Barber, Social Mobility and Voting Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally,
 1969), 259.
 35 William Stevens, "Fuel Crisis Reaches Deep into National Psychology, New York
 Times (July 1, 1979), 81: James C. Hyatt, "Maturing in 'Era of Scarcity' is Seen Alter-
 ing Views on Money, Middle Class Life," Wall Street Journal (August 6, 1979);
 "Pessimism about State of Nation Increases as Economic Expectations Plummet,"
 Gallup Opinion Index (August, 1979), 23-28. See also S. M. Lipset, "Predicting the
 Future of Post-Industrial Society," in S. M. Lipset, ed. The Third Century: America
 as a Post-Industrial Society (Stanford, Cal: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 24-35, and
 "Life in 1985 looks Bleak, but Stick Around, Futurists Say 2050 Will be Better,"
 Arizona Republic (November 10, 1980), 1; Paul Blumberg, Inequality in an Age of
 Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Richard J. Barnet, The Lean
 Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980).
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 cupies. Thus, current income, relative to past, is more important
 than longstanding, perhaps inherited, wealth.36
 Measuring Scarcity
 We have no direct indicator for measuring whether a citizen
 perceives the United States as entering an era of scarcity. We there-
 fore employed a proxy to evaluate individual reactions if resources
 were to become scarce: if the American economic pie were to shrink.
 In other words, we are examining the consequences of scarcity, a
 severe decline in the overall standard of living.
 To operationalize this variable, we chose the following question
 from the National Opinion Research Center's General Social
 Survey. "During the last few years has your financial situation
 been getting better, getting worse, or has it stayed the same?"
 "Losers," those who perceive their economic situation to be
 deteriorating, should be less supportive of democratic values, less
 confident in the government, and more cynical about the operation
 of the political system than should "non-losers," those whose
 economic situation has improved or stayed the same.
 Preliminary analysis showed that while self-perceived financial
 status was not related to region or sex, it did vary with levels of in-
 come, education, age, and race. (See Table 1) Therefore, it was
 necessary to control for these four factors in order to explore their in-
 dependent effects on the attitudinal and behavioral variables.
 Measuring Democratic Behavior and Values
 Actual democratic behavior was measured in several ways. First,
 we explored the question of voter turnout to see if economic at-
 titudes were related to political participation. Our hypothesis sug-
 gested that refusal to vote is an indication that an important
 democratic value is being rejected. Measures of "extreme"
 ideological self-perception (liberal or conservative) were included
 on the practical grounds that radical ideology indicates a rejection
 of mainstream political philosophies. Closely associated with this
 idea was the notion that those whose financial situation was getting
 worse would be less likely to identify with the Democratic or
 Republican parties and more inclined toward political in-
 36 Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry (New York: Morrow, 1942), and
 the discussion of Mead's theories in Potter, 47-50.
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 dependence. Finally, we explored the respondents' organizational
 memberships. Drawing on the arguments of Almond and Verba,
 we suspected that active membership in organizations should foster
 democratic values.37
 We are aware that these measures of democratic behavior are sub-
 ject to question. Like many of the tools of behavioral political
 science, they were devised during a more "peaceful" era. It may
 well be that extremist ideology and mainstream party non-
 identification are less tenable evidences of decaying democracy than
 they once seemed to be. But that conclusion makes for a separate
 debate, beyond the scope of the present paper. We have chosen to
 apply the traditional yardsticks rather than attempt to resolve that
 debate.
 Support for civil liberties, confidence in governmental institu-
 tions, and personal and political cynicism were measured by a
 number of different questions. Those concerning the first amend-
 ment rights of atheists, communists, and homosexuals were derived
 from Samuel Stouffer's work on political tolerance.38 These ques-
 tions deal theoretically with the fundamental democratic rules of
 the game and go directly to the heart of a democratic political
 system.
 There is controversy over the accuracy of these questions as
 measures of support for civil liberties. Some researchers have
 argued that Stouffer's work is timebound, and that his indicators of
 tolerance are influenced by the feeling a respondent has toward the
 target-group. As such, they are better measures of policy
 preferences than abstract support for civil liberties.39
 Others contend that the Stouffer scale is still useful and that it
 relates well to other current measures of tolerance.40 Our intent is
 not to compare the willingness to tolerate non-conformists over time
 37 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton
 University Press, 1963) 265.
 38 Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (Garden City,
 NY: Doubleday, 1955), 262-266.
 30 John L. Sullivan, James Pierson and George E. Marcus, "An Alternative Concep-
 tualization of Political Tolerance," American Political Science Review, 73 (September
 1979), 781-794.
 40 Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr. and J. Allen Williams, Jr., Tolerance for
 Nonconformity (San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass, 1978), 50; Michael Corbett,
 "Education and Contextual Tolerance," American Politics Quarterly, 8 (July 1980),
 345-359. See also responses to the Sullivan article contained in the correspondence
 section, American Political Science Review, 74 (September 1980), 780-784.
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 as most of Stouffer's critics have done, but to use his questions to dif-
 ferentiate one group, losers, from another, non-losers. Thus, these
 indicators suit our purpose well. Three-item scales were created to
 measure the tolerance of atheists, communists, and homosexuals.
 Inter-item correlations within each of the three scales were con-
 sistently high (Gamma >.82). For each scale, the questions used
 were whether a non-conformist should be allowed to (1) teach in a
 college; (2) give a speech in the respondent's community; and (3)
 have a book he wrote in the public library.
 Beliefs about the larger political system were examined in a
 number of ways. The respondents' attitudes toward particular
 government institutions were measured by their confidence in the
 executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. A scale
 composed of these three items was attempted, but inter-item cor-
 relations were weak (Gamma >.47, <.70), and the items were
 therefore kept separate.
 Affect for the political system was explored through an alienation
 scale. Some scholars suggest that negative system affect threatens
 the stability of the political system.4' Thus, a government which
 purports to be sensitive to political demands but which is perceived
 as unresponsive to a large segment of the population might be sub-
 jected to severe attacks on its legitimacy. NORC's six alienation
 questions were treated as a simple additive scale because the inter-
 item correlations did not meet minimal Guttman criteria (G >.47,
 <.74). We reported this scale in our tables for the sake of simpli-
 city, because the results for each item were similar to those for the
 entire scale when run against the dependent variable.
 Political cynicism was operationalized through the most politi-
 cally oriented of the General Social Survey's anomia items: "Most
 public officials are not really interested in the problems of the
 average man." Cynicism in interpersonal relations was measured
 by three questions on whether people are fair, helpful, and
 trustworthy. In addition, an interpersonal relations scale was
 derived from those three items to contrast optimists with pessimists.
 Again, the inter-item correlations were strong, though still short of
 fhe Guttman level, (G>.60, <.70). Both scale and separate item
 results are reported for this aspect of cynicism.
 One of the problems in using these standard indicators of con-
 41 See, e.g., Edward N. Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support,"
 American Political Science Review, 71 (June 1977), 454.
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 fidence, alienation, and cynicism, is the confusion over whether the
 respondent is making a statement about his feelings toward the
 political system per se or a political statement about a particular in-
 cumbent administration.42 This is an important distinction because
 negative affect for an incumbent should not lead to within-system
 aggressive behavior, but negative affect toward the larger political
 system might.
 Furthermore, the literature is even unclear as to the direct conse-
 quences of a decline in support for the political system. Perhaps it
 will lead to violence-perhaps not. We can assume, however, that
 the erosion of political values regarding the government is not
 healthy. And, more important, as Muller has argued, if such ero-
 sion is accompanied by an ideology which justifies political aggres-
 sion, then political instability will surely follow.43 This problem is
 endemic to all research employing survey indicators as proxies for
 presumed behavior, and we cannot settle the issue here.
 Possible Period Effects
 NORC's seven annual surveys since 1972 allowed trend analysis
 for self-perceived economic status during an economically unstable
 period. The first two surveys covered a period of some prosperity.
 Then came the 1973 energy crisis, and the 1974 and 1975 surveys
 were administered during a recession. The last three surveys,
 1976-78, occurred during an economic upswing. We first examined
 the relationship between self-perceived financial status and the
 dependent variables to see if changing economic conditions had left
 any noticeable impact on our hypothesis. If the types of relation-
 ship between independent and dependent variables differed
 substantially among the three periods, we were prepared to analyze
 each time period separately.
 Analysis through separate time-periods did not prove to be
 necessary. Although there was some "period effect," the relation-
 ships between variables were highly uniform across the three time
 periods." In other words, support for democratic values dipped
 during the mid-70s, but the relationships between economic status
 perception and the dependent variables remained constant: there
 42 Edward N. Muller and Thomas 0. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Sup-
 port," American Political Science Review, 71 (December 1977), 1561-1563.
 43 Muller, "Behavioral Correlates," 467.
 4" Table available from the authors.
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 was no secular trend toward an erosion of democratic attitudes and
 behavior from 1972-78 even though many commentators have in-
 dicated that conditions were worsening. Consequently, our
 analyses were based upon the combined 1972-78 sample of 10,652
 respondents.
 FINDINGS
 Turning first to the question of political behavior, we found few
 indications that the losers in our sample were more likely to isolate
 themselves from the world of democratic politics than the non-
 losers. Those few tendencies toward isolation which did show up
 disappeared when controls for education, income, age and race
 were applied. The one exception to this overall finding was
 organizational membership. Even when controls for race, educa-
 tion and age were invoked, loser status led to more introverted
 behavior. Because&this finding is contrary to the results in each of
 our other behavioral areas, one is tempted to dismiss it as an artifact
 of the data. Yet it is an intriguing finding, because a number of
 scholars have posited a direct relationship between organizational
 membership and the American style of democracy.45 Should this
 relationship turn out to be an actual result of declining economic
 abundance, it could portend a change in the support structure of
 democracy which would pave the way for extremist political
 movements.46 Overall, however, our findings seem to confirm
 those of political scientists who have discovered no visible relation-
 ship between severe economic hardship and atypical political ac-
 tions.
 For our attitudinal categories, however, the hypothesis was
 strongly confirmed. Alienation, anomia, and interpersonal rela-
 tions showed moderately strong gammas and high significance levels
 (Table 2). Not quite as strong, but still in the predicted direction
 and statistically significant, were the findings for confidence in
 governmental leadership.
 The three tolerance scales, taken from Stouffer, do not show that
 non-losers are more tolerant than losers, which could be interpreted
 in two ways. On the one hand, it could suggest that severe
 45 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.
 46 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press,
 1959), 230-231.
 ceI * * * * * *
 H
 p-4
 ; E N N X N ~co - m
 cj~~~~~~~~~ cj~C1 o - 4 .
 co1 i ODCc - I D i m
 -E Q Z
 D~~~~~~o Co C- I- -- bt 10 10 10 co (
 H ~~~~~~~L
 U
 p-4
 co t- OD C -
 L) C- c ) bc o co co co co c o cs s -
 Z~~
 3 i0
 Z t oo 10 0p p-4 p-
 Z4 ?y cq 4 cq _- C o- C N N)
 ,
 PV4
 oC >
 = ; 3 E; > ,,CA 4-8
 r _ Q = o Y o:; Q~~4-
 4: - w E ;R W
 4- >, -',E = X v v4
 _ 1 _ -,4 M -
 4- > <
 bt 0
 co g- E 124
 10~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ coW L0 CO
 C, o', Zc-
 _1 10 CD co 0 CO 10 _o "Ot t 10 "t?
 C o Cm
 Cf0 't C _- t- Cf CO rK _0 0 CK CD'n oEQs
 Cl~~~~~~~~ t 11 Q 4 -
 PL _
 b, C)tY
 CD t t K b b o K Cf o CD K o o ? ^ oo ? -~~~~~~~~PL
 Cs b 00 b CO K oo o CO K Cf K b Cf e ,, r VtCo
 CD b Cf t CO oo s CO CO Cf _ CO K K oo Q ~~~~~~~~~~~Cs
 r.~~ = 1=
 ~~~C) M -Y
 1.4~ = M 4 CZ - ,
 bC E = bl bC E ho 0
 C ) cn C sc 5c 3 ) co ,
 382 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 44, 1982
 economic decline does not dispose one toward rejecting the rules of
 the democratic game. As such, this result would be in line with our
 behavioral findings discussed above. On the other hand, it may
 simply be a confirmation of the argument that Stouffer's measures
 are not accurate indicators of political tolerance. Because the
 results do not conform to the other attitudinal indicators, we are in-
 clined to accept this interpretation.
 The independent variable related more directly to attitudinal
 than to behavioral differences. This fact points to the importance
 of attitudes as mediators between the economic environment and
 people's political behavior.47 Assuming that resource scarcity
 would be the main cause of any mass deterioration in financial
 status, then we would not predict that scarcity, in and of itself,
 would directly affect political activity. Attitude change would
 have to precede changes in behavior. The attitudinal changes,
 however, could be a function of events other than a decline in access
 to abundant resources.
 It is possible that the relationships discussed above are merely ar-
 tifacts of basic demographic differences, for as Table 1 indicates,
 self-perceived economic status relates closely to a respondent's loca-
 tion in the social structure. Accordingly we controlled for the four
 significant demographic conditions that emerged in Table 1. The
 resulting Tables, 3 through 6, show that these demographic dif-
 ferences mask few substantial relationships.
 There was some tendency for the non-loser and loser groups to
 become less polarized as income and education increased. This was
 particularly true for education. Furthermore, while blacks as a
 group were substantially more alienated than whites, the differences
 between white non-losers and losers were generally greater than
 those between black non-losers and losers: the impact of the finan-
 cial status variable seemed less significant for blacks than for
 whites-which may be because many blacks have lived in an en-
 vironment of relative scarcity for most of their lives and may be
 more immune to immediate economic impacts.48
 Furthermore, age did not seem consistently to reduce the
 47 For confirmation of this point, see Lawrence Santi, "Turnout and Trust in
 Government, 1964-1972," (paper delivered at the Western Political Science Associa-
 tion, San Francisco, March 27-29, 1980), 17.
 48 See John M. Ostheimer and Leonard G. Ritt, "Environment, Energy, and Black
 Americans," Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences: Human Ecology Series,
 90-125 (1976).
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 polarities found between losers and non-losers. This trend may be a
 function of the fact that there are substantial pockets of poverty
 among the very young and the very old and that, as we have shown,
 the polarity is intense at the lower end of the socio-economic scale.
 CONCLUSION
 This study has dealt with a question of central concern to the
 American political process: will a decline in abundance have a cor-
 rosive effect on American democracy? We must reluctantly con-
 clude that the answer is "yes." Our data provide support for the
 proposition that self-perceived financial decline is related to a
 weakening of the attitudes most supportive of democracy. There
 does not, however, seem to be the same relationship between loser
 status and political behavior. It may be, as we have suggested, that
 democratic attitudes play an intervening role between economic
 conditions and political behavior. Thus, the assertion that declin-
 ing abundance will adversely affect democracy may need to be
 refined to include the mediating effects of attitudes.
 The attitudes that support the American form of democracy are a
 delicate balance between competition and individualism on the one
 hand, and expectations of interpersonal relations based on trust and
 fairness on the other. It is notable that regardless of socio-economic
 status, losers tend to have less faith in their fellow man than do non-
 losers, for it is a central democratic axiom that interpersonal trust is
 an essential condition for the maintenance of such a system. Com-
 petition in an ever-expanding economic system can be seen as a
 healthy contribution to the general welfare. But as the economic
 pie ceases to grow and even shrinks, such behavior is more likely to
 engender tensions and hostilities which have the potential to erode
 the foundations of the political order. If the resource pressures that
 some scholars believe will inevitably constrain our material pros-
 perity are real ones, one consequence will be a weakening in our col-
 lective commitment to democracy, and we can expect an ever in-
 creasing bitterness to infect American politics.
